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Abstract
We study an optimal execution problem in the presence of market impact where the
security price follows a geometric Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, which implies the mean-
reverting property, and show that the optimal strategy is a mixture of initial/terminal
block liquidation and gradual intermediate liquidation. The mean-reverting property
describes a price recovery effect that is strongly related to the resilience of market im-
pact, as described in several papers that have studied optimal execution in a limit order
book (LOB) model. It is interesting that despite the fact that the model in this paper
is different from the LOB model, the form of our optimal strategy is quite similar to
those obtained for an LOB model. Moreover, we discuss what properties cause grad-
ual liquidation as an optimal strategy by studying various cases and find out that not
only “convexity of market impact function” but also “price recovery effect” (or, in other
words, transience of market impact) are essential to make a trader execute the security
gradually to mitigate the effect of market impact.
Keywords : Optimal execution, Market impact, Liquidity problems, Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process, Gradual liquidation
1 Introduction
The basic framework of the optimal execution (liquidation) problem was established in
Bertsimas and Lo [7], and the theory of optimal execution has been developed by Almgren and
Chriss [4], He and Mamaysky [13], Huberman and Stanzl [15], Subramanian and Jarrow [26],
and many others (see also Gatheral and Schied [11], in which we survey dynamic models of
execution problems). Optimal execution problems arise naturally in trading operations, such
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as when a trader tries to execute a large trade for a security. In these cases, the trader should
take care about liquidity problems and, in particular, should not neglect market impact (MI),
which plays an important role in execution cost. Here, MI means the effect that a trader’s
investment behavior has on security prices.
To study the MI of a trader’s execution policy, we consider a case where a trader sells held
shares of the security after predicting a decrease in the price of the security. In a frictionless
market, a risk-neutral trader should sell all shares as soon as possible, and so the optimal
strategy is block liquidation at the initial time. However, in real markets, traders tend to
liquidate a position over time. The factors that lead to gradual liquidation are therefore
important.
Convexity of MI is one factor that would dissuade traders from block liquidation. As
shown in examples in Kato [16], a risk neutral trader in a market of the Black–Scholes type
will gradually liquidate if MI follows a quadratic function; in contrast, block liquidation is
optimal when MI is linear. However, many traders in the real market execute their sales over
time despite recognizing that MI is not always convex.
Risk aversion also will affect a trader’s execution policy, providing an incentive to trade
over a longer period. Schied and Scho¨neborn [24] consider the optimal strategies when the
utility function rewards risk aversion and clarify the relation between the degree of risk aversion
and the form of the optimal strategy. Additionally, He and Mamaysky [13] treat execution
problems in a Black–Scholes-type model with a linear MI function and numerically derive some
no-trading regions of optimal strategies; in such regions the optimal strategies are not all block
liquidation. Howoever, from Lions and Lasry [20] and Kato [16], we know that the optimal
strategy under a linear MI function is not gradual in several cases: it is block liquidation at
the initial time even when the trader is risk averse so long as the risk-adjusted drift coefficient
of the security price is nonpositive.
Another important motive for liquidation over time is that, due to the effect of MI, a
security price may recover after a downward movement in price. Such a phenomenon is called
a “price recovery effect,” and such effects implicitly describe transient MI (see Gatheral and
Schied [11] for details). In this paper, to consider a price recovery effect, we focus on the case
where the process of a security price has the mean-reverting property, and, in particular, we
focus on when it follows a geometric Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) process. We explicitly solve
the optimization problem with static execution strategy for a linear MI and show that the
optimal strategy is a mixture of initial/terminal block liquidation and gradual intermediate
liquidation. Our study in this paper is also shown to be a representative case of when gradual
liquidation is necessary in the framework of Kato [16] even with a linear MI and risk-neutral
trader.
Our results are related to those of studies of execution problems in limit order book (LOB)
models. In a LOB model, sales by a trader decrease buy limit orders, thereby temporarily
expanding the bid–ask spread, and new buy limit orders appear over time, causing the bid–
ask spread to shrink as time passes. The problem of minimizing expected execution cost in
a block-shaped LOB model with exponential resilience of MI is studied in Obizhaeva and
Wang [22]. A mathematical generalization of the results of Obizhaeva and Wang [22] is given
in Alfonsi et al. [1] and Predoiu et al. [23]. Additionally, Makimoto and Sugihara [21] treat
a model of optimal execution under stochastic liquidity. It is interesting that despite the fact
that the model in this paper is different from the LOB model, the form of optimal execution
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strategies in our model become quite similar to the optimal strategies found in papers focusing
on an LOB model. Indeed, when the security price process has no volatility, the form of our
optimal strategy coincides with those in Alfonsi et al. [1] and Obizhaeva and Wang [22]: the
rate of intermediate liquidation is constant. When the volatility is larger than zero, the rate
decreases over time, as is found in Makimoto and Sugihara [21].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model settings. In Section
3, we explicitly solve our optimization problem and give the forms of optimal strategies. We
additionally discuss essential properties of MI that induce gradual liquidation. Section 4
summarizes our study. Section A is an appendix, where the derivation of our model from
discrete-time models (Section A.1) and the proofs of our results (Section A.2) are given.
2 The Model
Our model is based on that of Kato [16]. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P ) be a filtered space satisfying
the usual conditions (i.e., (Ft)t is right continuous and F0 contains all P -null sets), and let
(Bt)t≥0 be a standard one-dimensional (Ft)t-Brownian motion. We consider a simple market
model in which there are only two financial assets: cash and a security. We assume that the
risk-free rate of return is zero, so the price of cash is always 1. We study the execution problem
of a single trader who has Φ0 ≥ 0 shares of the security.
First, we prepare the class of admissible execution strategies. Let T > 0 be a time horizon.
We assume without loss of generality that T = 1. We denote by AT (Φ0) the set of Borel-
measureable functions (ζr)0≤r≤T such that
(a.) ζr ≥ 0 for each r ∈ [0, T ], and
(b.)
∫ T
0
ζrdr ≤ Φ0.
Here, ζr is regarded as the execution speed at time r: hence, at time r, the instantaneous sales
volume is ζrdr. Condition (a.) means that the trader executes only sell orders. Moreover, by
(b.), the trader cannot sell more than ϕ shares, and so short selling is prohibited in our model
(see also Section 2 in [16]).
Now, we define a value function that corresponds to the trader’s optimization problem.
In this paper, we treat mainly optimization of the expected cost; that is, the trader tries to
maximize expected proceeds. For t ∈ [0, 1], (w, ϕ, s) ∈ D := R× [0,Φ0]× [0,∞), we define
Vt(w, ϕ, s; uRN) = sup
(ζr)r∈At(ϕ)
E[Wt], (2.1)
subject to
dWr = ζrSrdr, (2.2)
dXr = σdBr + β(F −Xr)dr − αζrdr, (2.3)
Sr = exp(Xr) (2.4)
and
(W0, X0) = (w, log s). (2.5)
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(When s = 0, we have Sr ≡ 0 and Xr ≡ −∞.) Note that the set At(ϕ) of admissible
strategies is defined in the same manner as AT (Φ0) is defined. Here, Wr, Sr, and Xr denote,
respectively, the trader’s cash holdings, the security’s price at time r, and the security’s log-
price at time r. A risk-neutral trader is assumed to have utility function uRN. The parameter
α ≥ 0 characterizes a linear permanent MI: when the trader sells ζrdr at time r, the log-price
decreases by αζrdr. When α = 0, there is no MI; (Xr)r follows the OU process with mean-
reversion speed β > 0 and volatility σ ≥ 0. We remind the reader that the transient MI is
described by the mean-reverting property of (Xr)r. Here, we can write down the explicit form
of the solution of (2.3):
Xr = e
−βr log s+ (1− e−βr)F − αe−βr
∫ r
0
eβvζvdv + σe
−βr
∫ r
0
eβvdBv. (2.6)
Remark 1. As in [16], we restrict neither the security price process nor the MI function to
specific forms such as the OU process and the linear MI, respectively. In general, the process
(Xr)r is given as the solution of the following stochastic differential equation:
dXr = σ(Xr)dBr + b(Xr)dr − g(ζr)dr, (2.7)
where σ, b : R −→ R are Lipschitz-continuous functions and g : [0,∞) −→ [0,∞) is a convex
function. Moreover, the set of admissible strategies is generalized to the set of adaptive
strategies (see Section A.1). Our model is just an example of a model from [16], but there are
some technical gaps: in [16], σ and b are assumed to be bounded, whereas, b(x) = β(F − x)
in (2.3) is not bounded. However, results similar to those in [16] will still be obtained; these
are derived in Section A.1.
Remark 2. When considering optimal execution problems for a risk-neutral trader, that is,
when the trader’s purpose is to maximize the expected proceeds of execution (equivalently, to
minimize the expected execution cost), adaptive (stochastic) optimal strategies often become
static (deterministic) strategies (see Alfonsi et al. [1], Kato [16], Kuno and Ohnishi [19],
and Schied and Zhang [25], for instance). Moreover, there are several papers that study the
optimal execution problem with static strategies (Almgren and Chriss [4], Bertsimas and Lo [7],
Konishi and Makimoto [18], and Makimoto and Sugihara [21], etc.). In these cases, the trader
predetermine a strategy before starting execution at t = 0. Such a static optimal strategy
is often called an Implementation Shortfall (IS) strategy. Following the above circumstances,
we treat mainly optimal execution problems with static strategies in this paper, except for in
Section A.1.
3 Main Results
In this section, we give explicit forms for the value function and the optimal strategies when
the security holdings ϕ is small enough or large enough. Further, we discuss which properties
will cause gradual execution to be optimal under MI. For brevity, we set y = σ2/(4β) and
z = log s − F . We assume z > 2y(≥ 0) so that the security price falls to the fundamental
value eF as time passes.
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3.1 No MI case
First, we introduce the forms of optimal strategies when there is no MI (i.e., when α = 0).
Theorem 1. If α = 0, then Vt(w, ϕ, s; uRN) = w + ϕs.
In this case, the trader’s (nearly) optimal strategy is given by
ζˆ0,δr =
ϕ
δ
1[0,δ](r) (3.1)
with δ → 0. More precisely, if we denote by (Wˆ δr )r the corresponding process of cash holdings,
it follows that
E[Wˆ
δ
t ] −→ Vt(w, ϕ, s; uRN), δ ↓ 0. (3.2)
We call such a strategy an “almost block liquidation” at the initial time (see also Remark 5.3
in [16]).
Remark 3. We can solve the optimization problem even when z ≤ 2y. Indeed, if (0 <
)2e−βty < z ≤ 2y, then an optimal strategy is given by ζˆ t
∗,δ
r =
ϕ
δ
1[t∗,t∗+δ](r), which is the
almost block liquidation at time t∗, where t∗ = log(2y/z)/β. Moreover, if z ≤ 2e−βty, then
the optimal strategy is the terminal almost block liquidation ζˆ t,δr =
ϕ
δ
1[t−δ,t](r). Therefore, in
each case when the market is fully liquid, the optimal strategy is block liquidation.
3.2 The case of small ϕ
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that the MI function is non-trivial and linear;
that is, we assume that α > 0. In this subsection, we study cases where ϕ is small. In the
previous subsection, we see that a trader in a fully liquid market (i.e., α = 0) should sell all
securities at the initial time. In fact, when ϕ is small enough, the trader’s optimal policy is
almost the same as initial block liquidation.
Theorem 2. If ϕ ≤ (z − 2y)/α, then
Vt(w, ϕ, s; uRN) = w +
1− e−αϕ
α
s. (3.3)
The form of (3.3) is the same as that in Theorem 8 of Kato [16]. The trader’s (nearly)
optimal strategy is also given by (3.1). This result implies that if the trader has a small
number of shares of the security, then MI provides no incentive to take liquidate gradually.
3.3 The case of large ϕ
When ϕ is not small, the assertion of Theorem 2 fails. The trader’s selling accelerates the
speed of decrease of the security price, and so a quick liquidation may be non-optimal because
of the effect of MI. Moreover, if the trader’s execution makes the price drop below eF , then
the price will recover to eF by delaying the sale. This gives the trader an incentive to liquidate
gradually. Our purpose in this subsection is to derive an explicit (nearly) optimal execution
strategy.
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3.3.1 No volatility case
Firstly, we study the special case where σ = 0. This setting gives a price model that is
unrealistic and not meaningful in an actual market because the random fluctuation of the
security price is ignored. However, doing so yields an interesting similarity to the results of
other studies of optimal execution.
Let P (x) = e−αx(1−αx). Since the function P is strictly decreasing on (−∞, 2/α], we can
define its inverse function as P−1 : [−e−2,∞) −→ (−∞, 2/α].
We assume that the security holdings ϕ is larger than z/α. We define the function C(p) =
Ct,ϕ(p), p ∈ R as
C(p) = exp(α(tβ + 1)p− αϕ− tβz) + αp− z − 1.
Since C(p) is strictly increasing and C(z/α) < 0 < C ((ϕ− z/α)/(1 + βt)), the equation
C(p) = 0 has a unique solution p∗ = p∗(t, ϕ) ∈ (ϕ− z/α, (ϕ− z/α)/(1 + βt)). Then, we can
show that the following theorem is true.
Theorem 3. If ϕ > z/α(> 0), then it holds that
Vt(w, ϕ, s; uRN) = w +
1− e−α(p
∗+q∗)
α
s+ tse−αp
∗
ζ∗, (3.4)
where ζ∗ = ζ∗(t, ϕ) and q∗ = q∗(t, ϕ) are given by
ζ∗ = β(p∗ − z/α), q∗ = ϕ− p∗ − tζ∗.
Note that one can easily check that p∗, ζ∗, q∗ > 0. We can then construct a nearly optimal
strategy as follows (with δ ↓ 0):
ζˆδr =
p∗
δ
1[0,δ](r) + tζ
∗ +
q∗
δ
1[t−δ,t](r). (3.5)
That is, (3.2) holds for (Wˆ δr )r given by (2.2) with (ζˆ
δ
r )r.
The strategy (ζˆδr )r consists of three terms. The first term in the right-hand side of (3.5)
corresponds to initial (almost) block liquidation. The trader should sell p∗ shares of the
security at the initial time by selling infinitesimal pieces at infinitesimal intervals to avoid a
decrease in the execution proceeds. The second term corresponds to gradual liquidation. The
trader executes the selling gradually until the time horizon at constant speed ζ∗. Finally,
the trader completes liquidation by selling the remaining shares by terminal (almost) block
liquidation, which corresponds to the third term. So, the nearly optimal strategy is a mixture
of both block liquidation and gradual liquidation. We point out, in particular, that gradual
liquidation is necessary for optimality in this case. Figure 1 shows an image representing the
form of the optimal strategy. In fact, the security price on the interval (δ, 1− δ) is equal to a
constant se−αp
∗
.
This result is quite similar to that of Alfonsi et al. [1] and Obizhaeva and Wang [22],
despite the fact that there are some mathematical differences between their models and ours.
We consider the geometric OU process for a security price. In contrast, Alfonsi et al. [1]
and Obizhaeva and Wang [22] assume that the process of a security price follows arithmetic
Brownian motion (or a martingale) and that there is exponential (or some more general shape
of) resilience for MI in an LOB model. The relation between the mean-reverting property of
the OU process and the resilience of MI causes this interesting similarity in results.
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Almost block liquidation
Gradual liquidation
(constant speed)
Figure 1: Shape of a nearly optimal strategy (ζδr )r (left) and the corresponding amount of
security holdings (right), both when σ = 0. The horizontal axes are time (r).
3.3.2 The general case
In this subsection, we consider the general case, where σ ≥ 0. We assume the following
condition:
ϕ >
max{z, 1 + β}
α
. (3.6)
This condition means that the amount of the trader’s security holdings is larger than that in
the case of Section 3.3.1. We define the function H(λ) = Ht,ϕ(λ) on [0,∞) by
H(λ) = α exp
(
αβ
∫ t
0
P−1
(
exp(−e−2βry)λ/α
)
dr − αϕ+ z − y
)
− λ.
Note that H is nonincreasing on [0,∞). Moreover, (3.6) implies that
H
(
αe−y
)
≤ 0 < H(0),
and so the equation H(λ) = 0 has the unique solution λ∗ = λ∗(t, ϕ) ∈
(
0, αe−y
]
. The next
theorem is the main result in this section.
Theorem 4. Let t ∈ (0, 1], (w, ϕ, s) ∈ D and assume that (3.6) is true. Then,
Vt(w, ϕ, s; uRN) = w +
s
α
(
1− exp
(
−αϕ+ αβ
∫ t
0
ξ∗rdr
))
+β
∫ t
0
ξ∗r exp
(
F − αξ∗r + (1 + e
−2βr)y
)
dr, (3.7)
where ξ∗r = P
−1(exp(−e−2βry)λ∗/α).
We can construct a nearly optimal strategy as follows (with δ ↓ 0):
ζˆδr =
p∗
δ
1[0,δ](r) + ζ
∗
r +
q∗
δ
1[t−δ,t](r), (3.8)
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Figure 2: Shape of a nearly optimal strategy (ζδr )r (left) and the corresponding amount of the
security holdings (right), both when σ > 0. The horizontal axes are time (r).
where p∗ = ξ∗0 + (z − 2y)/α and
ζ∗r = βξ
∗
r −
2βλ∗e−2βry exp(αξ∗r − e
−2βry)
α2(2− αξ∗r )
+
2βy
α
e−2βr
= βξ∗r +
2βye−2βr
α(2− αξ∗r )
,
q∗ = ϕ− β
∫ t
0
ξ∗rdr − ξ
∗
t −
z
α
+
y
α
(1 + e−2βt).
Here, the second equality of the definition of ζ∗r comes from P (ξ
∗
r ) = exp(−e
−2βry)λ∗/α. By
the inequalities (3.6), z ≥ 2y, and 0 ≤ ξ∗r ≤ ξ
∗
0 ≤ 1/α, we see that each of p
∗, ζ∗r , and q
∗ is
positive.
Similarly to in the previous subsection, (ζˆδr )r also consists of three terms: initial (almost)
block liquidation, gradual intermediate liquidation, and terminal (almost) block liquidation.
However, unlike the case where σ = 0, the speed of execution becomes slower as time passes
when σ > 0. This is result is similar to that of Makimoto and Sugihara [21], in which the
optimal execution problem in an LOB market model with stochastic liquidity is studied.
Figure 2 shows a representation of an optimal strategy. We can rewrite the value function
(3.7) as the sum of an initial cash amount and the proceeds of initial/intermediate/terminal
liquidation:
Vt(w, ϕ, s; uRN)
= w +
1− e−αp
∗
α
s+ s
∫ t
0
e−αη
∗
r ζ∗r dr +
1− e−αq
∗
α
se−αη
∗
t , (3.9)
where η∗r = ξ
∗
r − (1 + e
−2βr)y/α+ z/α. Note that p∗ = η∗0 and ζ
∗
rdr = dη
∗
r + βξ
∗
rdr.
3.4 When does MI cause gradual liquidation? Case studies
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the properties of MI functions that incentivize gradual
liquidation of the security and give some examples.
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First, as a benchmark model, we consider the execution problem with risk-neutral trader
in a Black–Scholes-type model with no MI:
V ideal(Φ0) = sup
(ζr)r∈A1(Φ0)
E[W1]
subject to (W0, S0) = (w, s0), (2.2), (2.4), and
dXr = µdr + σdBr, (3.10)
where µ ∈ R and σ ≥ 0 are constants. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that µ˜ :=
−µ + σ2/2 > 0. In this case, an optimal strategy is initial block liquidation: since the
expected security price decreases as time passes, a risk-neutral trader will sell the security as
soon as possible. Then, we see that V ideal(Φ0) = Φ0s0.
Now, we introduce MI functions. We define V (Φ0) = V1(0,Φ0, s0; uRN), where the log-price
fluctuates according to
dXr = µdr + σdBr − g(ζr)dr. (3.11)
Note that V1(0,Φ0, s0; uRN) = Vˆ1(0,Φ0, s0; uRN) holds in this case by Proposition 5.1 of [16];
Vˆ1 will be defined in Section A.1. One of the simplest example is the linear MI function
g(ζ) = αζ . However, Theorem 5.2 in Kato [16] tells us that V (Φ0) = (1 − exp(−αΦ0))s0/α,
and the optimal strategy is (almost) initial block liquidation (3.1). This implies that a linear
MI is not sufficient to describe all situations in which a trader will gradually liquidate. On the
other hand, Theorem 5.4 of that paper shows that the optimal strategy is gradual liquidation
when g(ζ) is quadratic; in particular, the optimal strategy with small Φ0 is a time-weighted
average price (TWAP) strategy, that is, liquidation with constant speed (the same result
can be obtained when g is S-shaped; see [17]). Note that TWAP strategies are equivalent
to volume-weighted average price (VWAP) strategies with the time parameter t measuring
volume time (see Remark 22.7 in [11]).
Here, Theorems 3–4 from the previous subsections give another source of gradual liqui-
dation. In our model framework, a price-recovery effect also causes gradual intermediate
liquidation when Φ0 is large enough, even when the MI function is linear.
Therefore, the convexity of MI functions and price-recovery effects are essential properties
in the study of execution problems. Note that a price-recovery effect can be identified with
market resilience or, in other words, a transient MI function.
Remark 4. Linearity of MI functions is also discussed from another point of view. In several
studies of execution problems, a permanent MI function is often assumed to be linear. One of
the reasons is that this accords with results from empirical studies. For example, Almgren et
al. [5] estimate the form of MI functions in the real market and find that permanent MI function
is approximated by a linear function. Another reason is the absence of price manipulation:
Forsyth et al. [9], Gatheral [10], and Huberman and Stanzl [14] assert that we can construct
a price manipulation strategy when the permanent MI function is nonlinear. That is, in such
cases a trader can earn money by unscrupulously utilizing the effect of MI.
In contrast, in the LOB markets, nonlinear MI functions are often observed in empirical
studies (see Bouchard et al. [8], Weber and Rosenow [27], and Zovko and Farmer [28], for
instance). Moreover, Alfonsi and Schied [2] and Alfonsi et al. [1, 3] show that the opportunity
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for price manipulation is not present even when the MI function is convex under some technical
conditions. Therefore, nonlinearity of the MI function is not necessarily inappropriate.
In this paper, we mainly treat the case of a linear MI function g(ζ), but we can also study
the case of nonlinear g(ζ) in a similar way. It is meaningful to study the execution problem
with both convex MI function g and a price-recovery effect in our framework and to investigate
topics related to the opportunity for price manipulation (the unaffected price, given by (2.3)–
(2.4) with α = 0, is not a martingale; nevertheless, similarity to the results of LOB models
may ensure the absence of price manipulation in some sense).
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we solved the optimal execution problem in the case where the security
price follows a geometric Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process and the MI function is linear. This case
is important because it covers cases where the security price has a mean-reverting property.
We showed that an optimal static strategy is a mixture of initial/terminal block liquidation
and gradual intermediate liquidation when the initial amount of the security holdings is large.
When the volatility parameter is equal to zero, the optimal strategy has the same form as
the strategies found in Alfonsi et al. [1] and Obizhaeva and Wang [22]. In this case, a trader
should sell at a constant speed during the time horizon. When the volatility is positive, the
speed of gradual liquidation is not constant; instead, the speed is decaying and the form of
the optimal strategy is similar to that found in Makimoto and Sugihara [21].
Our result demonstrates a case in which MI causes gradual liquidation. In a real market,
traders sell shares of a security gradually to avoid costs due to MI because price recovery
is expected. As noted in Section 3.4, our results combined with findings from [16] imply
that convexity (or nonlinearity) of MI functions and price-recovery effects (or resilience) are
important factors in the construction of an MI model.
In Section 3, we restrict the class of admissible strategies to static strategies in view of IS
algorithms. It is obviously important to study the optimal execution problem for adaptive
strategies (Aˆt(ϕ) in Section A.1), which is one of our future tasks.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the continuous-time value function
In this subsection, we study the derivation of the continuous-time model of an optimal
execution problem by following the arguments in Appendix A of Kato [16]. We characterize
our continuous-time value function as a limit of discrete-time models in more general settings.
We define a discrete-time version of the value function with time intervals of width 1/n as
follows:
Vˆ nk (w, ϕ, s; u) = sup
(ψnl )
k−1
l=0 ∈Aˆ
n
k (ϕ)
E[u(W
n
k , ϕ
n
k , S
n
k )] (A.1)
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subject to
W nl+1 = W
n
l + ψ
n
l S
n
l exp(−gn(ψ
n
l )), ϕ
n
l+1 = ϕ
n
l − ψ
n
l , (A.2)
Xnl+1 = Y
( l + 1
n
;
l
n
,Xnl − gn(ψ
n
l )
)
, Snl+1 = exp(X
n
l+1) (A.3)
and (W n0 , ϕ
n
0 , S
n
0 ) = (w, ϕ, s), where u(w, ϕ, s) is a nondecreasing and continuous function
with polynomial growth rate in each of w, ϕ, and s, gn : [0,∞) −→ [0,∞) is a nondecreasing
and continuously differentiable function that satisfies gn(0) = 0, Y (t; r, x) is a solution of the
stochastic differential equation{
dY (t; r, x) = σ(Y (t; r, x))dBt + b(Y (t; r, x))dt, t ≥ r,
Y (r; r, x) = x,
(A.4)
and b, σ : R −→ R are Lipschitz-continuous functions. Here, Aˆnk(ϕ) is the set of stochastic
processes (ψnl )
k−1
l=0 such that ψ
n
l is Fl/n-measurable, ψ
n
l ≥ 0 for each l = 0, . . . , k − 1, and
k−1∑
l=0
ψnl ≤ ϕ. See [16] for the precise definitions and financial implications of (A.1). Note that
b and σ are assumed to be bounded in [16], but here we only assume that b and σ have linear
growth. Because of this, the OU case (2.3) is included in our settings (i.e., uniqueness and
existence of the solution Y (·; r, x) is guaranteed for each r ≥ 0 and x ∈ R).
We consider the limit as n→∞. Let h : [0,∞) −→ [0,∞) be a nondecreasing continuous
function. We quote the condition assumed in [16]:
[A] lim
n→∞
sup
ψ∈[0,Φ0]
∣∣∣ d
dψ
gn(ψ)− h(nψ)
∣∣∣ = 0.
Now, we define g(ζ) =
∫ ζ
0
h(ζ ′)dζ ′ for ζ ∈ [0,∞). This function corresponds to an MI function
in a continuous-time model. We define
Vˆt(w, ϕ, s; u) = sup
(ζr)r∈Aˆt(ϕ)
E[u(Wt, ϕt, St)] (A.5)
subject to (2.2)–(2.6) and ϕt = ϕ−
∫ t
0
ζvdv. Here, Aˆt(ϕ) denotes the set of admissible adaptive
strategies, that is, (ζr)0≤r≤t ∈ Aˆt(ϕ) is an (Fr)r-progressively measurable process such that
(a’.) ζr ≥ 0 for each r ∈ [0, T ] almost surely,
(b’.)
∫ T
0
ζrdr ≤ Φ0 almost surely, and
(c’.) sup
r,ω
ζr(ω) <∞.
Note that condition (c’.) is a technical condition; see Appendix A of [16] for the details. Here,
we make a further assumption:
[B] For each m ∈ N, there is a constant Cm > 0 such that E[ sup
0≤t≤1
exp(mY (t; 0, x))] ≤ Cme
mx.
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This condition does not seem to be natural in general, but our main model in Section 2
satisfies [B].
The following is a generalization of Theorem A.1 of [16].
Theorem 5. Assume that [A]–[B] hold. For each (w, ϕ, s) ∈ D, t ∈ [0, 1] and u ∈ C,
lim
n→∞
Vˆ n[nt](w, ϕ, s; u) = Vˆt(w, ϕ, s; u), (A.6)
where [nt] is the greatest integer less than or equal to nt.
By this theorem, we can characterize (A.5) as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time value
functions (A.1). Note that we can also obtain a similar convergence result by restricting the
classes of admissible strategies to classes of static strategies (Proposition 1 below).
To prove Theorem 5, we introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let t ∈ [0, 1], ϕ ≥ 0, (ζr)0≤r≤t ∈ Aˆt(ϕ), and let (Xr)0≤r≤t be given by (2.6).
Then, there is a constant C > 0, depending on only b and σ, such that
E
[
sup
r∈[r0,r1]
∣∣∣Xr −Xr0 +
∫ r
r0
g(ζv)dv
∣∣∣4]
≤ C(r1 − r0)
2{1 + (r1 − r0)
3
∫ r1
r0
E[g(ζv)
4]dv} (A.7)
for each 0 ≤ r0 ≤ r1 ≤ t.
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in almost the same way as the proofs of Propositions B.24–
B.25, but we apply condition [B] and Lemma 1 instead of Lemmas B.1 and B.3, respectively,
from [16].
Unlike the case where b is bounded, the right hand side of (A.7) depends on (ζr)r. However,
this does not change the essential method of proving the statements analogous to Theorems
3.1–3.2 and 4.1–4.2 of [16], except for the continuity of the continuous-time value function at
t = 0 when h(∞) =∞. We omit the details here.
A.2 Proofs
For brevity, we assume t = 1 until the end of this section. We define
fn =
1
α
sup
(ψnk )k∈A
n
n(ϕ)
f˜n(ψn0 , . . . , ψ
n
n−1). (A.8)
Here, Ann(ϕ) is the set of admissible deterministic strategies. That is,
Ann(ϕ) =
{
(xl)
n−1
l=0 ⊂ [0, ϕ]
n ;
n−1∑
l=0
xl ≤ ϕ
}
,
f˜n(x), x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ R
n, is defined by
f˜n(x) = α
n−1∑
k=0
exp
(
cknz − c
2k
n y − α
k−1∑
l=0
ck−ln xl
)∫ (k+1)/n
k/n
nxk exp(−α(nr − k)xk)dr
=
n−1∑
k=0
exp
(
cknz − c
2k
n y − α
k−1∑
l=0
ck−ln xl
)
(1− e−αxk),
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and cn = e
−β/n. Since the function f˜n(x0, . . . , xn−1) is nondecreasing in xn−1, we can replace
Ann(ϕ) in (A.8) with
An,SOn (ϕ) =
{
(xl)
n−1
l=0 ⊂ [0,Φ0]
n ;
n−1∑
l=0
xl = ϕ
}
⊂ Ann(ϕ).
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 1.
(i) fn −→ f , n→∞, where
f = sup
(ζr)r∈A1(ϕ)
f˜((ζr)r), (A.9)
f˜((ζr)r) =
∫ 1
0
ζr exp
(
e−βrz − e−2βry − αe−βr
∫ r
0
eβvζvdv
)
dr,
(ii) V1(w, ϕ, s; uRN) = w + e
F+yf .
Proof. An argument analogous to the proof of Proposition B.24–25 in Kato [16] yields assertion
(i). Assertion (ii) can be obtained by straightforward calculation. 
A.2.1 Proof of Theorems 1–2
We give the proof of only Theorem 2 because the proof of Theorem 1 is essentially the
same. By straightforward calculation, we obtain
f ≥ lim
δ→0
f˜((ζˆ0,δr )r) =
1− e−αϕ
α
ez−y,
where (ζˆ0,δr )r is defined as (3.1). On the other hand, for any (ζr)r ∈ A1(ϕ), we have
f˜((ζr)r) ≤
∫ 1
0
ζr exp
(
e−βrz − e−2βry − αe−βrηr
)
dr,
where ηr =
∫ r
0
ζvdv. From the relation z − 2y ≥ αϕ ≥ αηr, we have that
{z − y − αηr} − {e
−βrz − e−2βry − αe−βrηr}
= (1− e−βr)(z − (1 + e−βr)y − αηr) ≥ 0.
Thus,
f˜((ζr)r) ≤
∫ t
0
exp(z − y − αηr)dηr ≤
1− e−αϕ
α
ez−y.
Therefore, we get f ≤ (1− e−αϕ)ez−y/α, and this completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
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A.2.2 Proof of Theorems 3–4
Because Theorem 3 is a corollary of Theorem 4 (a small technical argument is necessary
to generalize the assumption (3.6)), we present the proof of only Theorem 4.
Let Ξn(ϕ) = {(x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ R
n ; x0 + · · · + xn−1 = ϕ}. Note that A
n,SO
k (ϕ) ⊂ Ξ
n(ϕ).
We set Q˜nk(x) =
l∑
m=0
cl−mn xm and Q
n
k(x) = −zc
k
n + yc
2k
n + αQ˜
n
k(x).
Lemma 2. min
k=0,...,n−1
Qnk(x) −→ −∞ as |x| → ∞ on Ξ
n(ϕ).
Proof. It suffices to show that min
k=0,...,n−1
Q˜nk(x) −→ −∞. Choose any M > 0. Let x ∈ Ξ
n(ϕ)
be such that min
k=0,...,n−1
Q˜nk(x) ≥ −M . Then, it holds that
xk + cnxk−1 + · · ·+ c
k
nx0 ≥ −M, k = 0, . . . , n− 1. (A.10)
From (A.10) with k = n− 1 and the equality xn−1 + · · ·+ x0 = ϕ, we observe
n−2∑
k=0
(
n−2−k∑
l=0
cln
)
xk ≤
M + ϕ
1− cn
. (A.11)
By (A.11) and (A.10) with k = n− 2, we have
n−3∑
k=0
(
n−3−k∑
l=0
cln
)
xk ≤
(
1
1− cn
+ 1
)
(M + ϕ).
Inductively,
k∑
k′=0
(
k−k′∑
l=0
cln
)
xk′ ≤
(
1
1− cn
+ n− 2− k
)
(M + ϕ) ≤ an(M + ϕ) (A.12)
for k = 0, . . . , n− 2, where an = {(1− cn)
−1 + n}.
By (A.10) and (A.12) with k = 0, we have −M ≤ x0 ≤ an(M + ϕ). Similarly, by (A.10)
and (A.12) with k = 1, we have −(1 + ancn)(M + ϕ) ≤ x1 ≤ (an + 1 + cn)(M + ϕ). By
an inductive calculation, we arrive at |xk| ≤ Cn(M + ϕ), k = 0, . . . , n − 2 for some Cn > 0.
Combining this with the relation x ∈ Ξn(ϕ), we also see that |xn−1| ≤ C
′
n(M + ϕ) for some
C ′n > 0.
The above arguments tell us the following: if a sequence (x(N))N ⊂ Ξ
n(ϕ) satisfies lim
N→∞
min
k
Q˜nk(x
(N)) 6= −∞, then (x(N))N is bounded. The desired assertion follows by contradiction. 
Lemma 3. f˜n(x0, . . . , xn−1) −→ −∞ as |x| → ∞ on Ξ
n(ϕ).
Proof. Let An(p) = e
−cnp+y − e−p, p ∈ R. This gives
f˜n(x) =
n−1∑
k=0
(e−cnQ
n
k−1(x)+yc
2k−1
n (1−cn) − e−Q
n
k (x))
≤ ez−y − e−Q
n
n−1(x) +
n−2∑
k=0
An(Q
n
k(x))
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for any x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ R
n, where Qn−1(x) = −c
−1
n z + c
−2
n y. We easily see that the
function An has an upper bound CA,n. Hence, it holds that
f˜n(x) ≤ ez−y − exp(−min
k
Qnk(x)) + An(min
k
Qnk(x)) + CA,n(n− 1).
Since lim
p→−∞
An(p) = −∞, we have the desired assertion by the above inequality and Lemma
2. 
A straightforward calculation gives
Lemma 4. For each k = 0, . . . , n− 2, it holds that
∂
∂xk
f˜n(x0, . . . , xn−1)
= cn
∂
∂xk+1
f˜n(x0, . . . , xn−1) + α(1− cn) exp(−c
2k
n y)F
n
k
(
k∑
l=0
ck−ln xl − c
k
nz/α
)
,
where
F nk (x) = e
−αx
(
1 + cn ·
1− ec˜nγ
n
k (x)
c˜n
)
, (A.13)
γnk (x) = αx+ (1 + cn)c
2k
n y, c˜n = 1− cn. (A.14)
Formally, the Taylor expansion of F n[nr](x) is given by
F n[nt](x) = e
−αx
{
1 + cnγ
n
[nt](x) +O(n
−1)
}
−→ e−αx
{
1 + αx+ (1 + 1)e−βty
}
= P (x) + 2e−αx−βty, n→∞.
The following lemma gives higher-order estimates of the above calculation.
Lemma 5. It holds that
max
k=0,...,n−1
sup
x∈K
∣∣n(F nk (x)− P (x) + 2e−αxc2kn y)−Gnk(x)∣∣ −→ 0, n→∞
for each compact set K ⊂ R, where,
Gnk(x) = βe
−αx(αx+ (2 + cn)c
2k
n y − cnR
n
k(x)),
Rnk(x) =
∫ 1
0
exp(v(1− cn)γ
n
k (x))(1− v)dv(γ
n
k (x))
2.
Proof. Using (A.13) and Taylor’s theorem, we have
F nk (x) = e
−αx {1− cn(γ
n
k (x)− c˜nR
n
k(x))}
= P (x)− 2e−αxc2kn y + c˜nG
n
k(x)/β.
Thus, it holds that∣∣n(F nk (x)− P (x) + 2e−αxc2kn y)−Gnk(x)∣∣ ≤ |nc˜n/β − 1| · |Gnk(x)|.
Since we have nc˜n −→ β as n→∞ and
|Gnk(x)| ≤ 2βe
2α|x|+2y(α|x|+ α2|x|2 + 3y + 4y2), (A.15)
we have obtained the desired assertion. 
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Because F nk is nonincreasing on E
n
k , we can define the (nonincreasing) inverse function
F n,−1k on [0,∞), where
Enk =
(
−∞,−
1
α
(
c2kn (cn + 1)y +
log cn
1− cn
)]
.
We consider an analogous approximation of F n,−1k , such as Lemma 5. For this, we let
I(q) =
d
dq
P−1(q) =
exp(αP−1(q))
α(αP−1(q)− 2)
,
Jnk (q) = − exp(−2c
2k
n y)I(exp(−2c
2k
n y)q)G
n
k(F
n,−1
k (q)),
εnk(q) = F
n,−1
k (q)− P
−1(exp(−2c2kn y)q) + 2c
2k
n y/α.
Lemma 6. It holds that
(i) max
k=0,...,n−1
sup
0≤q≤M
|εnk(q)| −→ 0,
(ii) max
k=0,...,n−1
sup
0≤q≤M
|nεnk(q)− J
n
k (q)| −→ 0
as n→∞ for each M > 0.
Proof. Assertion (i) is a direct consequence of assertion (ii), so we will prove only (ii). Take
any q ∈ [0,M ] and let xnk = F
n,−1
k (q). Since F
n
k (x) is nondecreasing with respect to n and k
for each fixed x, we get xnk ∈ KM for any n and k, where
KM =
[
F 1,−10 (M),
β
α(1− e−β)
]
.
Let R˜nk(x) = F
n
k (x)− P (x) + 2e
−αxc2kn y. From the relation
P (xnk)− 2e
−αxnk c2kn y + R˜
n
k(x
n
k) = q,
we have
P (xnk + 2c
2k
n y/α) = exp(−2c
2k
n y)(q − R˜
n
k(x
n
k)). (A.16)
Applying P−1 to both sides and subtracting P−1(eˆnkq), we obtain
εnk(q) = P
−1(eˆnk(q − R˜
n
k(x
n
k)))− P
−1(eˆnkq),
where we denote exp(−2c2kn y) as eˆ
n
k for brevity. Therefore,
|nεnk(q)− J
n
k (q)| ≤
∣∣∣∣−
∫ 1
0
I(eˆnk(q − vR˜
n
k(x
n
k)))dveˆ
n
knR˜
n
k(x
n
k) + eˆ
n
kI(eˆ
n
kq)G
n
k(x
n
k)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
v∈[0,1]
|I(eˆnk(q − vR˜
n
k(x
n
k)))| · |nR˜
n
k(x
n
k)−G
n
k(x
n
k)|
+|Gnk(x
n
k)|
∫ 1
0
|I(eˆnk(q − vR˜
n
k(x
n
k)))− I(eˆ
n
kq)|dv. (A.17)
Because Lemma 5 implies
max
k=0,...,n−1
sup
x∈KM∩E
n
k
|R˜nk(x)| −→ 0, n→∞, (A.18)
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we can see that
eˆnk(q − R˜
n
k(x
n
k)) > −e
−3/2/2 > −e−2 (A.19)
for large enough n and k = 0, . . . , n− 1. Combining the inequality
−
2e3/2
α
≤ I(q) < 0 <
d
dq
I(q) ≤
12e3
α
, x ≥ −e−3/2/2
with (A.17) and (A.19), we obtain
|nεnk(q)− J
n
k (q)| ≤
2e3/2
α
|nR˜nk(x
n
k)−G
n
k(x
n
k)|+
12e3
α
|R˜nk(x
n
k)| · |G
n
k(x
n
k)|.
Now, we complete the proof of the assertion (ii) by combining the above inequality with
Lemma 5, (A.15), and (A.18). 
Note that Lemma 6 guarantees that the following expansion is valid and that convergence
occurs:
F n,−1[nr] (q) = P
−1(exp(−2c2[nr]n y)q)− 2c
2[nr]
n y/α+
1
n
Jn[nr](q) + o(n
−1)
−→ P−1
(
exp(−2e−2βry)q
)
− 2e−2βry/α, n→∞.
Here, we study a discretization of the function H(λ). Let
Hn(λ) = α exp
(
α(1− cn)
n−2∑
k=0
F n,−1k (exp(c
2k
n y)λ/α)− αϕ+ z − c
2(n−1)
n y
)
− λ.
Lemma 6 immediately implies the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Hn converges uniformly to H on any compact subset of R.
By Proposition 2 and the fact that Hn is strictly decreasing on [0,∞), we can choose an n
large enough that there is a unique solution λˆn of Hn(λ) = 0 on (0, 2λ
∗). Moreover, it follows
that λˆn converges to λ∗ as n→∞.
From now, we construct an optimizer to fn for large enough n. Set ψˆnk = Tk(λˆ
n), k =
0, . . . , n− 1, where
T0(λ) = F
n,−1
0 (exp(y)λ/α) + z/α,
Tk(λ) = F
n,−1
k (exp(c
2k
n y)λ/α)− cnF
n,−1
k−1 (exp(c
2(k−1)
n y)λ/α), k = 1, . . . , n− 2,
Tn−1(λ) = ϕ− (1− cn)
n−3∑
k=0
F n,−1k (exp(c
2k
n y)λ/α)
−F n,−1n−2 (exp(c
2(n−2)
n y)λ/α)− z/α.
The following lemma is obtained from Lemma 6, the convergences n(1 − cn) −→ β and
λˆn −→ λ∗ as n→∞, and the finiteness of
sup
n,k
sup
q∈K∩Enk
|Jnk (q)| <∞
for each compact subset K of R.
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Lemma 7. It holds that
|ψˆn0 − p
∗|+ max
k=1,...,n−2
|nψˆnk − ζ
∗
k/n|+ |ψˆ
n
n−1 − q
∗| −→ 0, n→∞.
Lemma 7 and the relations p∗, ζ∗r , and q
∗ > 0 together imply the following lemma.
Lemma 8. It holds that ψˆnk > 0, k = 0, . . . , n − 1 for sufficiently large values of n; thus,
(ψˆnk )k ∈ A
n,SO
n (ϕ).
Now, we define an (n+ 1)-variable function Ln(x0, . . . , xn−1, λ) by
Ln(x0, . . . , xn−1, λ) = f˜
n(x0, . . . , xn−1) + λ(ϕ− x0 − · · · − xn−1).
Then, we have the following.
Lemma 9. When n is large enough, a solution of
∂
∂x0
Ln = · · · =
∂
∂xn−1
Ln =
∂
∂λ
Ln = 0. (A.20)
coincides with (ψˆn0 , . . . , ψˆ
n
n−1, λˆ
n).
Proof. Suppose that a vector (x˜0, . . . , x˜n−1, λ˜) is a solution of (A.20). Then, we have that
x˜0 + · · ·+ x˜n−1 = ϕ, and Lemma 4 implies
λ˜ = cnλ˜+ α(1− cn) exp(−c
2k
n y)F
n
k
(
k∑
l=0
ck−ln x˜l − c
k
nz/α
)
;
hence,
k∑
l=0
ck−ln x˜l = F
n,−1
k (exp(c
2k
n y)λ˜/α) + c
k
nz/α, k = 0, . . . , n− 2. (A.21)
Then, we see that x˜k = Tk(λ˜), k = 0, . . . , n− 1. Therefore,
0 =
∂
∂xn−1
Ln(x˜0, . . . , x˜n, λ˜)
= α exp
(
cn−1n z − c
2(n−1)
n y − α
n−1∑
l=0
cn−1−ln x˜l
)
− λ˜ = Hn(λ˜).
Since λˆn is the unique solution of Hn(λ) = 0, we have that λ˜ = λˆ
n. This equality also implies
x˜k = Tk(λˆ
n) = ψˆnk , k = 0, . . . , n− 1, and so the solution of (A.20) is also unique. 
Now, we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 3. It holds that fn = f˜n(ψˆn0 , . . . , ψˆ
n
n−1)/α for sufficiently large values of n.
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Proof. By Lemma 3, we can find anM > 0 large enough so that f˜n(x) < 0 holds for x ∈ Ξn(ϕ)
when |x| ≥ M . Then, f˜n has at least one local maximum on (−M,M)n, which we denote by
x˜ = (x˜0, . . . , x˜n−1). By the Lagrange multiplier method, we see that there is a λ˜ ∈ R such
that (A.20) holds at (x˜, λ˜). Then, Lemma 9 implies x˜k = ψˆ
n
k for k = 0, . . . , n− 1. This means
that (ψˆ1, . . . , ψˆn−1) is the unique local maximum, which also becomes the global maximum of
f˜n on Ξn(ϕ). 
Now, we prove Theorem 4. We write f˜n(ψˆn0 , . . . , ψˆ
n
n−1) as the following three parts:
f˜n(ψˆn0 , . . . , ψˆ
n
n−1) = e
z−y(1− e−αψˆ
n
0 )
+
n−2∑
k=1
exp
(
cknz − c
2k
n y − α
k−1∑
l=0
ck−ln ψˆ
n
l
)
(1− e−αψˆ
n
k )
+ exp
(
cn−1n z − c
2(n−1)
n y − α
n−2∑
k=0
cn−1−kn ψˆ
n
k
)
(1− e−αψˆ
n
n−1)
=: A˜n + B˜n + C˜n,
where A˜n, B˜n, and C˜n are defined in the obvious way. By Lemma 7, we easily have
A˜n −→ e
z−y(1− e−αp
∗
), n→∞. (A.22)
Using the relation (A.21) and Lemmas 6–7, we have
C˜n = exp
(
(cn−1n − c
n−2
n )z − c
2(n−1)
n y − αF
n,−1
n−2 (exp(c
2(n−1)
n y)λˆ
n/α)
)
×(1− e−αψˆ
n
n−1)
−→ exp
(
e−2βy − αP−1(exp(e−2βy)λ∗/α)
)
(1− e−αq
∗
)
= ez−ye−αη
∗
1 (1− e−αq
∗
) (A.23)
as n→∞. To calculate the limit of B˜n, we set
Bˆn =
α
n
n−2∑
k=1
exp
(
c2kn y − αξ
∗
k/n
)
ζ∗k/n.
Then, we have
|B˜n − Bˆn| ≤ e
z
{
n−2∑
k=1
∣∣∣e−αψˆnk − e−αζ∗k/n/n∣∣∣+ n−2∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣1− e−αζ∗k/n/n − αζ
∗
k/n
n
∣∣∣∣
}
+
α
n
n−2∑
k=1
∣∣∣exp(−c2kn y − αF n,−1k (exp(c2kn y)λˆn/α)− exp(c2kn y − αξ∗k/n)∣∣∣ ζ∗k/n
−→ 0, n→∞ (A.24)
by virtue of (A.21) and Lemmas 6–7. Moreover, we have
lim
n→∞
Bˆn = α
∫ 1
0
exp(e−2βry − αξ∗r )ζ
∗
rdr = αe
z−y
∫ 1
0
e−αη
∗
r ζ∗r dr.
By (A.22)–(A.25), we see that w+ eF+y(A˜n + B˜n+ C˜n)/α converges to the right-hand side of
(3.9). Then, we obtain the desired assertion by Propositions 1 and 3. 
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